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KOSILEK V. SPENCER: GENDER IDENTITY
DISORDER IN PRISON: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN
EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION WHEN IT
COMES TO MEDICAL AND MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT OF INMATES
Andrea Chiz Plyler1
I. INTRODUCTION
What medical rights are prisoners, in the United States of
America, entitled to under the Eighth Amendment?  When security is
compromised or public and political backlash is imminent, are consti-
tutionally protected medical rights and treatments altered or
diminished?
In Kosilek v. Spencer,2 a Massachusetts District Court Judge en-
tered an order requiring that the Massachusetts Department of Cor-
rections provide “necessary” and “adequate” medical treatment to an
inmate suffering from Gender Identity Disorder and that the failure to
do so is a violation of the inmate’s Eight Amendment right prohibit-
ing cruel and unusual punishment.3  An appeal from the Commis-
sioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections is anticipated
in the near future.4
Transgender medical issues in United States prisons have been
on the rise in the last decade; however, the Massachusetts District
Court is the first court in the country to rule in favor of an inmate
demanding a gender-reassignment procedure, while incarcerated, for
the purpose of treating a severe mental illness.5  The decision in
Kosilek contains an in-depth analysis of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and examines what constitutes “ade-
1. B.A., Pfeiffer University, Political Science 2009; J.D. candidate at North
Carolina Central University School of Law, 2013 and a staff editor of the
Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Law Review.
2.  Kosilek v. Spencer, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Martha Neil, In Landmark Ruling, Federal Judge Says Sex-Change
Surgery for Murder Inmate is Medically Necessary, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/in_landmark_ruling_federal_judge_says_
sex-change_surgery_for_murder_inmate_/.
56
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quate care” in terms of medical needs of imprisoned persons.6  The
Kosilek decision further explores whether Gender Identity Disorder,
based on the severity of the diagnosis, can be treated through gender-
reassignment surgery alone, as opposed to psychotherapy and hor-
mone treatments.7 Kosilek raises the issue of how much deference
and discretion is, and should be, allotted to the Department of Correc-
tions in determining the course of action for its inmates based on
security, safety, funds, and public policy.
This note will focus on the potential legal, political, and policy
issues affected by the Kosilek decision as well as the long-term ef-
fects and consequences that the decision will have on our modern
legal system.  This note will also provide a factual background of the
case over the past twelve years and include a historical roadmap of
similar cases across the country that have ruled on transgender medi-
cal issues in the prison system.  Finally, this note will explore the
risks involved, benefits that could be gained, the potential impact,
and possible upheaval that the Kosilek decision could create if it
withstands its anticipated appeal.  Is the Kosilek decision the begin-
ning of a shift in our legal system, or does it serve merely as an
outlier?
II. THE CASE
Michelle Kosilek (Kosilek), born Robert Kosilek, is an inmate
and the plaintiff in this matter who brought an unprecedented suit
against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Cor-
rections (“DOC”)8 by seeking a government provided sex-reassign-
ment surgery.9  Kosilek brought the action on the grounds that a de-
nial of such medical treatment, to treat his mental illness of severe
gender identity disorder, is a violation of his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment.10
Kosilek is currently serving out a life sentence, without the pos-
sibility of parole, in a Massachusetts correctional facility for the mur-
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id. at *6.
8. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159, 164 (2002) (Kosilek was
transferred to the DOC in 1993 following his murder conviction in 1992.  The
original action brought by Kosilek against the Bristol County Sheriff was amended
at that time to include the DOC.).
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id.
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der of his wife.11  Kosilek was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disor-
der (GID), and the DOC was provided with a report of the diagnosing
doctor’s findings in March of 2000.12  Due to this diagnosed mental
illness, Kosilek is suffering from “mental anguish,” which has re-
sulted in two failed suicide attempts and an attempted castration
while in prison.13
Legal action began in 1993 when Kosilek filed a pro se lawsuit
(Kosilek I) alleging that he was being “denied adequate medical care
for his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.”14  In 2002, the court eventually found
that “there [was a] high risk that Kosilek [would] harm himself if he
[did] not receive adequate treatment for his severe mental illness.”15
However, the court concluded that Kosilek failed to prove that the
Commissioner of the DOC had been “deliberately indifferent” to his
“serious medical need” and, thus, failed to hold that an Eighth
Amendment violation had occurred.16  The court reasoned that the
lack of medical treatment that Kosilek was demanding was “rooted in
sincere security concerns, and in a fear of public and political criti-
cism as well.”17
Following the court’s ruling in Kosilek I, the Massachusetts
DOC began taking limited steps in recognizing and treating Kosilek’s
GID.18  However, in 2006, another trial (Kosilek II) commenced after
a series of affidavits and depositions19 of medical professionals rec-
ommending treatment for Kosilek was neither followed nor adhered
to by the DOC.20  The issues raised in Kosilek II were purely based
on the Eighth Amendment: (1) whether Kosilek’s GID is considered
a serious medical need; and (2) is a sex-reassignment procedure med-
ically necessary as the only adequate medical treatment?
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (Kosilek’s pro se action was
brought pursuant to this statute.).
15. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 165.
16. Id. at 195.
17. Id. at 162.
18. 17 Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *22.
19. See Seil Aff., Feb. 23, 2003; Appelbaum Dep., Dec. 1, 2005; Schmidt
Aff., Nov. 23, 2005; Ettner Aff., Nov. 14, 2005; Forstein Aff., Oct. 31, 2005;
Brown Aff., Oct. 12, 2005; Kaufman & Kapila Aff., Oct. 7, 2005.
20. 19 Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *53.
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In 2010, the DOC created a GID Treatment Committee and en-
acted a policy to regulate GID inmates and handle security concerns
pursuant to the Commissioner’s guidance.21  The newly-created com-
mittee “is responsible ‘for reviewing the overall treatment of all GID
diagnosed inmates . . . on a quarterly basis[.]’”22  The policy states:
The Treatment Plan for inmates diagnosed with GID shall not
contain provisions for services that are not medically necessary
for the treatment of GID within the Department. These elective or
cosmetic services generally include but are not limited to:
a. Feminization or masculinization procedures such as laser hair
removal and/or electrolysis for permanent facial, chest or
other body hair removal . . .
b. Plastic surgery, including . . . rhinoplasty, tracheal shaving,
facial feminization/masculinization, mastectomy . . . (FTM),
and breast augmentation (MTF) . . .
c. Genital sex reassignment surgery is prohibited as it presents
overwhelming safety and security concerns in a correctional
environment.23
The policy went one step further to require a full “security review” by
the GID Management and Security Committee, and requires that the
final and binding decision within the DOC be made by the
Commissioner.24
Presiding United States District Judge, Mark L. Wolf, ruled in
favor of Kosilek, holding that the Commissioner of the DOC “shall
take forthwith all of the actions reasonably necessary to provide
Kosilek sex reassignment surgery as promptly as possible.”25
III. BACKGROUND
1. Gender Identity Disorder: Treatments, Eligibility, and
Potential Reclassification
“Gender identity disorder is a conflict between a person’s physi-
cal gender and the gender he or she identifies as. . . . Identity conflicts
need to continue over time to be a gender identity disorder.”26  GID is
defined and classified by the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
21. Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 240 (2012).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *53.
26. U.S. National Library of Medicine, Gender Identity Disorder:
Transsexualism; Transgender, A.D.A.M. MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 13,
2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002495/.
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Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revised” (also referred to as
“DSM IV TR”).27  The World Professional Association for Trans-
gender Health (“WPATH”), formally known as the Harry Benjamin
International Gender Dysphoria Association, is the leader in develop-
ing the course of clinical treatment for health care professionals who
treat GID through the promulgation of the “Standards of Care”
(“SOC”).28  There are three major “areas of therapy,” as designated
by the SOC, which include “(1) hormone therapy; (2) a real-life expe-
rience living as a member of the opposite sex; and (3) sex reassign-
ment surgery.”29  There are eligibility requirements that must be ful-
filled in order to begin each particular stage of therapy.30
The unanswered issues that arise out of the SOC are: what con-
stitutes a real-life experience in prison and what are the long term
benefits of a sex-reassignment surgery?  In Soneeya v. Spencer, a
strikingly similar action was brought against the Commissioner of the
Massachusetts DOC, alleging Eighth Amendment violations in regard
to a failure to provide a sex-reassignment procedure.31  The Commis-
sioner’s expert witness, Dr. Stephen Levine,32 brought an opposing
opinion as to real life experience in prison.33  Dr. Levine suggested
that a sex-reassignment may never actually be “medically appropriate
for a patient who has not undergone the real life experience as a free
person” based on the requisite criteria needed under the SOC.34  Dr.
Levine further suggested that data from long-term studies is not avail-
able, and there is no data showing “positive outcomes for GID pa-
tients who have undergone sex reassignment surgery[,]” which is
likely due to the fact that the majority of patients cannot be relocated
27. Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 228, 231.
28. Id.; See generally World Professional Association for Transgender
Health, http://www.wpath.org.
29. Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 232; See also E. Coleman et al., 13 Int’l J.
Transgenderism 165, 165-232 (2011).
30. Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id. (“Dr. Stephen Levine is a practicing clinical psychiatrist who
specializes in sexuality. He is also a professor of psychiatry at Case Western
Reserve University, and has written a number of scholarly articles and publications
in the field of psychiatry and human sexuality. He was the chairman of the writing
group that was commissioned to write the fifth version of the Harry Benjamin
Standards of Care . . .  [and] co-founded the Case Western Reserve University
Gender Identity Clinic.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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years after the surgery is completed.35  However, Dr. Randi Kaufman
of the Fenway Community Health Center of Massachusetts36  fol-
lowed the same position as taken by the SOC, “which indicate[s] that
the evidence available shows generally positive outcomes for most
patients who have sex-reassignment surgery.”37
Finally, it has recently been suggested that GID, which is cur-
rently classified as DSM-IV, could be demoted to Gender Dysphoria
– a condition that is no longer classified as a “disorder” under mental
health, but rather a “medical diagnosis.”38  The result of demoting
GID to Gender Dysphoria would be to de-stigmatize and “treat it is as
any other medical condition involving an anatomical abnormality that
can be corrected by surgery.”39
2. The Eighth Amendment: The Applicable Standards
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits cruel and unusual punishment.40  The Kosilek case raises the
question of what medical treatment or lack of medical treatment for
inmates within the prison system implicates the Eighth Amendment?
“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’41 but
neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that ‘the
treatment a prisoner receives in prison . . . [is] subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment.’”42  The United States Supreme Court
further held in Farmer v. Brennan, that the Eighth Amendment “im-
poses duties on these [prison] officials, . . . [who] must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing shelter, and medical care.”43
In order to bring a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
35. Id.
36. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *24. (The Fenway Clinic is the “foremost
referral center in New England for individuals with gender identity disorders.”).
37. Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
38. James Phillips, Gender Identity Disorder in Prison: Depending on a
Diagnosis that is Soon to Disappear?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://
www.psychiatrictimes.com/gender-disorders/content/article/10168/2105073.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
42. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339 (1981); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31
(1993)).
43. Id.
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to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”44
There is both a subjective and an objective prong that must be estab-
lished in an Eighth Amendment claim.45  The objective prong re-
quires an inmate to demonstrate that “he is incarcerated under condi-
tions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and the subjective
prong requires that the substantial risk of harm be known by the
prison official.46  However, when prison officials refuse to render cer-
tain medical care or treatments “based on reasonable, good faith
judgments balancing the inmate’s medical needs with other legiti-
mate, penological considerations[,]” no violation will occur, regard-
less of whether the two prongs are met.47
3. The Eighth Amendment: Medically Necessary and Adequate
Care
The court determined that Kosilek had a serious medical need,
making the requested sex-reassignment surgery medically neces-
sary.48  Kosilek had been diagnosed by doctors who specialize in
GID—a diagnosis recognized by the medical community as well as
the courts.49  The court further held that “Kosilek is now suffering
from a degree of mental anguish and that itself constitutes a serious
harm that requires adequate treatment.”50
Over the long course of this ongoing legal controversy, there
have been courts across the country making parallel rulings that could
have an effect on rulings to come in the Kosilek case.51  In 2010, the
United States Tax Court made changes to what medical procedures
may be classified as “cosmetic” in stating that “the evidence estab-
lishes that cross-gender hormone therapy and sex reassignment sur-
gery are well-recognized and accepted treatments for severe GID.”52
The court held that GID is a disease and therefore does not fall under
definition of “cosmetic surgery” as defined by the Internal Revenue
44. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
45. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 836.
46. Id.
47. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *11.
48. Id. at *33.
49. Id.; See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir., 2011);
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r., 134 T.C. 34, 38-40 (2010).
50. Id.
51. See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, (2010); Fields v. Smith, 653
F.3d 550 (7th Cir., 2011).
52. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 70 (2010).
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Code.53  In determining whether GID was a ‘serious medical need,’
the court in Kosilek relied heavily on the 2010 United States Tax
Court’s decision that stated: “Seven of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
that have considered the question have concluded that severe GID or
transexualism constitutes a ‘serious medical need’ for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment.”54
The SOC provides the “care acceptable to prudent professionals
who treat individuals suffering from [GID].”55  Adequate treatment
and care is not required to be ideal treatment or care but must be
“services that reasonably commensurate with modern medical sci-
ence and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional stan-
dards.”56  In regard to the reasonable treatment for Kosilek, expert
witnesses at the second trial had opposing views.57  Dr. George
Brown, employed by the DOC, as well as all the doctors that testified
with the exception of one, “opined that sex reassignment surgery, to-
gether with hormones and psychotherapy, is necessary to provide
Kosilek with ‘minimally adequate and medically necessary’ care.”58
A psychiatrist from John Hopkins University School of Medicine, Dr.
Schmidt, opined that “instead of sex reassignment surgery, Kosilek
should be provided psychotherapy and antidepressants, and be put on
a ‘suicide watch’ to keep him from succeeding in killing himself.”59
The court was ultimately persuaded by the opinions of the majority of
medical professionals who testified at trial and found that adequate
care of a sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.60
4. Security and Safety Concerns
In Kosilek I, the court recognized that if there was a legitimate
security concern, then the court can take such concern into considera-
53. Id.; See also 26 U.S.C. §213 (d)(9)(B) (2005).
54. Id. at 62; See also De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
2003); Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. Appx. 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2nd Cir. 2000); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970
(10th Cir. 1995); Phillips v. Michigan Dept. of Corr., 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991);
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408, 411-13 (7th Cir. 1987).
55. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *35.
56. U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987).
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 38.
60. Id. at 41.
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tion when there is a potential Eighth Amendment violation alleged.61
The court further held that “political or public criticism” is not
enough to disregard a constitutional right and to rely on such would
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.62  The First Circuit
Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation regarding serious se-
curity concerns in a 2011 case, Battista v. Clarke.63  In Battista, the
DOC gathered and relied upon statistical data from the ‘Prison Rape
Elimination Act of 2003’64 (“PREA”), in which they argued “that the
risk of sexual assault was higher . . .” causing a security breach
within the prison.65  In the present action before the court, the Com-
missioner of the DOC argued that “security considerations preclude
providing the treatment DOC doctors have prescribed Kosilek[;]”66
however, the court determined that the delay in Kosilek’s treatment
was “pretextual” and not made in good faith.67  DOC officials who
testified at trial stated that they could maintain the safety of Kosilek
by placing Kosilek in a segregated unit as a type of “protective
custody.”68
IV. ANALYSIS
The decision in the Kosilek case has the potential to transform
the law and future decisions in a radical way.  Being a pioneer in the
area of GID, this ongoing legal controversy is ultimately setting the
stage for the nation.  Other states will be awaiting the final determi-
nation in Kosilek in order to anticipate similar situations arising
within their own courts.
The court in Kosilek made many determinations regarding the
necessary treatment Kosilek was entitled to receive by the DOC, and
the majority of those determinations were based on the opinions of
medical professionals specializing in GID or similar areas.  As was
noted in the Kosilek cases, the testimony and opinions of medical
61. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
62. Id. at 157
63. Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 450 (1st Cir. 2011) (where an
anatomically male prisoner brought action against officials of the Massachusetts
DOC for “deliberate indifference to his medical needs” for GID).
64. National Prison Rape Statistics, Data and Research, 42 U.S.C. §15603
(2005).
65. Battista, 645 F.3d at 451.
66. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660 at *43.
67. Id. at *44.
68. Id. at *48.
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professionals can be found to fit both sides of the argument, leaving
the judge to determine not only the legal implications regarding the
“adequate treatment” required, but the medical implications as well.
The issue that then presents itself is: how much power and discretion,
in the hands of one judge, is too much?
It is also difficult to base a decision, which has far-reaching
ramifications, on changing and unstable medical classifications—
classifications with potentially little statistical data.  It is suggested
that the medical community may demote the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual’s classification of GID from a mental health disorder to the
medical diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria.69  If demoted to the classifi-
cation of Gender Dysphoria, GID would no longer be considered a
mental illness in the realm of psychiatry, which would likely alter the
entire recommended course of treatment of GID or how it is dealt
with medically.70  An article in the Psychiatric Times gives an exam-
ple how this diagnosis could turn into a “slippery slope:”
[Imagine] [t]he prisoner is now someone suffering from Body
Dysmorphic Disorder who is convinced that his breasts are too
large and make him feel like a women.  He is distressed to the
point of feeling suicidal over his ability to correct this defect sur-
gically. Will we as psychiatrists testify that such surgery is the
appropriate and necessary treatment for his condition? Or will we
argue that such surgery is not medically necessary and qualifies
merely as “cosmetic” surgery?71
In this example, Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) is classified as a
disorder, meaning that if GID is demoted and no longer classified as
a disorder, BDD will have a “higher status as a ‘major mental ill-
ness’” as opposed to GID.72  With this anticipated transformation of
classifications, it is essential to have more statistical data to deter-
mine the benefits and success rates of gender reassignment surgeries
and treatments before courts can begin making such medical
decisions.
Anticipating an appeal, the key aspect of the Kosilek case will
be whether the DOC can present real, present, and relevant security
concerns that are legitimate.  At this point in Kosilek, the DOC has
yet to present a meaningful and legitimate security concern that jeop-
ardizes or could potentially jeopardize the safety and well-being of
69. Phillips, supra note 37.
70. Id.
71. Id. 
72. Id.
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the inmates and those employed by the DOC.  It could be projected
that an appeal may have a completely different outcome if it is found
that the DOC was not “deliberately indifferent” to the medical needs
of Kosilek. However, alternatively, the decision could also be af-
firmed without a showing of legitimate safety/security concerns on
the part of the DOC.
The DOC will need to focus on the security risks that will arise
before and after gender reassignment surgery; including living ar-
rangements, escape risks, and medical risks.  Once the surgery is
completed, the DOC will have to determine whether to house the
inmate in the male or female facility.  If housed in the male prison,
the question becomes: will the risk of sexual assault be an issue, more
so than living in the male prison prior to surgery?  Will security be
breached? Would the threat of escape rise if a female inmate is al-
lowed to reside in a male prison?  Finally, with the medical attention
and medication needed prior to, as well as, following the procedure,
will there be a breach in the security and safety in the medical wing
or within the general population?  It is essential that each of these
concerns is analyzed, current security measures are tested, and risks
are anticipated. Upon appeal, the DOC will need to present thorough
information, statistics, and collected data in order to have even the
slightest chance of overturning the current decision.
V. CONCLUSION
As a shift in legal precedent begins to occur and mental health
disorders and diagnoses are becoming more acceptable in the legal
community, more cases similar to Kosilek are likely to present them-
selves across the country.  It is essential to have a consistent and ac-
curate basis in which to approach each of these legal controversies.
This will require the medical community to have a dependable model
and classification system in place upon which courts may rely.  The
issue at hand is only the beginning; Kosilek will likely set the bar for
determining and approaching mental health and medical treatment
within the United States prison system when treating patients suffer-
ing from GID.
